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ON THE SUBJECT OF

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Democracy and Empire. By A. E. Duchesne. (Royal Colonial Institute Monographs.) Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1916. Pp. viii, 120.

Cleon's famous remark that "a democracy cannot govern an empire" has done duty on many an examination paper. In attempting a serious enquiry into its truth Mr. Duchesne has furnished students of the Empire and its problems with more valuable and detailed information on the dependencies of the crown than, we believe, can be found anywhere in the same compass. For the excellence of these later chapters and the graphical appendices one can well forgive a slightly youthful Toryism in the earlier part and the use of "proletariate" on page 9 and "proletarian" on page 19.

Mr. Duchesne might also have gone to Thucydides for the conception, on which he does well to insist, that democracy must mean the whole people and not the People, for the speech of Athenagoras (VI. 39) makes the first announcement of this political wisdom.

Of course, Mr. Duchesne's finding is that history on the whole bears Cleon out, with reservation in the case of France, where Democracy has certainly done better than Empire. This is due partly to common citizenship between the more advanced colonies and the mother country, and partly to the fact that "the average Frenchman, not being a prospective colonist himself, has very little interest in colonial matters, which are therefore left to experts". This latter reason reminds one of the passive virtue which Aristotle and Mommsen find in undeveloped democracy. Mr. Duchesne emphasizes the necessity of trusting the "man on the spot", and it surely remains the wisdom of democracy

that while it must know and watch, whether or people, it must also trust.

We must accept the universal modern trend toward democratic forms of government. If an ideal democracy "is one which is so governed as to afford the fullest possible recognition of the rights of individual citizens, whilst these citizens in their turn are possessed of an adequate ideal of duty", if we work toward that ideal and succeed in lifting the government of dependencies and foreign policy in general out of the range of partisan politics, is it not credible that such a democracy could govern peoples on their path toward self-government? As a matter of fact, our democracy must.

Canadians will observe with deep interest the rise of the question of fiscal autonomy in India, and the article of the London *Spectator* on "India and the Empire" of March 10, 1917, furnishes practical comment on the chapters on India and Indian problems. The author may well claim that two years of the war have made some of his doctrine, which must have seemed revolutionary to half of his people, the common-places of newspaper discussion, and he himself admits that "much of what seemed to be the character of our democracy has vanished".

British Colonial Policy, 1783-1915. By C. H. Currey.
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1916. Pp. 266.

There is a significant parallel, which Mr. Currey has not observed, between his heroes, "the theorists of 1830", and the present group of young Englishmen who co-operated in the creation of the last great Dominion and then gave themselves to the study of the whole Imperial problem in the Round Table movement. Durham, Wakefield, Buller and Molesworth are justly entitled to be called the fathers of colonial autonomy. History has not yet passed its verdict on the work of the other group.

In this brief and excellent survey of the evolution of self-government in the Dominions Mr. Currey sees a process at work which he personally hopes will find its term in (we

condense for him) "a permanent union" on terms of absolute equality, of "puissant nations", acknowledging their allegiance to one sovereign. He would frankly call himself a nationalist. He is apparently unaware of Mr. Ewart's *Kingdom . apers.* The betrayals of Canadian interests which impart a regrettable bitterness to Mr. Ewart's work are here paralleled by the officious blundering of "Mr. Mother Country". But it cannot be said that there is any *animus*. With generous fairness Mr. Currey points out the reluctance of the colonies to assume the burden of their home defence, and, while he severely censures Mr. Churchill's concentration of the fleet in the North Sea without consultation with the Dominion governments, he recognizes its wisdom. Though these "puissant nations" will be bound together by "co-operative alliances" (*sic*), Mr. Currey would doubtless repudiate any charge of advocating a British alliance of sovereign nations. He has evidently not analysed the problem sufficiently to realize the implications of the "co-operation" in which he believes. He desires that the Dominions should have an equal voice in foreign policy, he admits that the Dominions are not contributing their proper share to the common defence, and he betrays no feeling of reluctance to share the Imperial responsibilities of war. His hope of solving the Imperial problem lies in developing the Imperial Conference.

Mr. Currey's nationalism keeps its feet on the very solid earth. He is an ardent supporter of preferential trade. We are reminded that "during the first forty years of the nineteenth century there was no dispute of any moment between the Colonial Office and the colonies as to the nature of their commercial relations", and he quotes Adam Smith's remark, "as defence is of much more importance than opulence, the Act of Navigation is perhaps the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England". In a word, "preferential trade is the enabling condition of Imperial unity", and the Imperial government has dangerously long denied the Dominions the trade advantages for which they have persistently asked, and which they once enjoyed in re-

markable measure (see pp. 37-8). "Jan Hofmeyr was only the first of modern Imperialists to warn the Empire that where a colony's treasure is, there would its heart be also".

While Mr. Currey has made no attempt to analyse the co-operation for which he stands, he is at great pains to analyse and dismiss as impossible any such plan of federation as Sir Joseph Ward's (made wholly, as we know, on his personal initiative): (1) Defence and foreign policy are bound up with commercial policy, which "*wages war peacefully on other nations*". (2) Minority representation would be intolerable to the Dominions. (3) A federal parliament would encroach upon Dominion autonomy; Australia would have to abandon her navy; the Dominions could not control their immigration, nor fix the conditions of labour on their mercantile marine; had the Laurier-Taft pact been carried, it would have been annulled. (4) It has always been regarded with more favour in the homeland, but even there it would be rejected: "Authority cannot be shared", Mr. Asquith reminds us. (5) Liberalism in the United Kingdom would never abandon free trade. (6) Finally, India and the dependencies could not be given proportionate representation and would therefore be "condemned to remain permanently under the rule of the Colonial and Indian Office".

In short, what Mr. Currey really advocates, in urging the development of the beginning we have made in the Imperial Conference, is an Imperial "co-operation" of equals *in which the Dominion co-operators have determined beforehand the plan of Imperial defence*. "The only policy which is consonant with the nationalist aspirations of these Dominions and may be calculated to allay their fears is one which supports the creation of Australian, New Zealand and Canadian Navies, growing as their Dominions grow and working with the units maintained by the Imperial government to safeguard their interests in the far east, for the common advantage of the Empire".

Truly this is nationalism in its youth and without much sense of humour. With this context Canadian readers will find interest in Mr. A. G. Gardiner's article, *Imperial Defence After the War*, in the *Contemporary Review* for January 1917. "We must remember", he says, "that at bottom the attachment of the colonies to the Empire is an attachment of self-interest". Mr. Gardiner evidently contemplates with satisfaction the probability that the submarine will banish the windy ideal of a federated Empire.

Imperial Unity and the Dominions. By Arthur Herriedale Keith. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916. 11p. 626.

One loses this finely documented study with the feeling that the author of *Responsible Government in the Dominions* has rendered the Empire a real service at a very critical moment. Mr. Keith's sympathy with the ideal of Imperial unity is deep, but he never allows himself to stray from the solid ground of fact and existing sentiment. His work is quite indispensable for the statesman, the constitutional lawyer and the serious student of political movement within the Empire; and it is difficult to say whether one more admires his great knowledge of legal and constitutional detail or the skill with which he depicts the constitutional trend, the susceptibilities and local colour of the various self-governing units of the Empire. He believes that the ultimate form which the Empire may take may well be one which has no existing parallel, but that with some form of unity as our goal or hope, the path of wisdom is, as far as possible, to complete autonomy in the parts while at the same time we go on to develop common action in the whole. He presents with sobering power the great difficulties to be surmounted in our progress toward any forms of federation, though his own belief is not doubtful that they lie less in human perversity than in the immaturity of national youth. Time, liberty, responsibility will alter the latter, and the great experiences through which we are passing will, we may hope, so quicken the sense of Imperial duty that the relations of the Dominions and the United Kingdom will be

lifted out of the sphere of partisan conflict, that Dominion statesmen will less frequently make the naïve confession of Sir Charles Tupper (*Recollections of Sixty Years*, p. 95), or Imperial statesmen regret the partisan use of the grave situation in Natal in 1906.

Mr. Keith does not feel the weakness of the party system so keenly as Mr. Lash, but his solid volume bears a curious resemblance to the latter's modest book. It has an equally definite and practical purpose, being on the whole nothing less than an exhaustive argument for a series of clearly defined suggestions, which are presented in the conclusion for the consideration of the Imperial Conference at the close of the war. These suggestions would complete responsible government in Canada in the fields of the declaration of martial law, the dissolution of Parliament, the exercise of the prerogative of pardon, and the regulation of merchant shipping, where Canadian autonomy is not yet as complete as may be supposed. The Revised Statutes of 1906, for instance, embody a Copyright Act of 1889 and an Act providing for the marking of deck and load lines, neither of which the Imperial government has yet sanctioned. The power, moreover, of the Imperial government to reserve or disallow Dominion legislation should disappear. It should be possible, where Imperial interests are really involved, to secure modification in Dominion legislation by negotiation. Failing this, in a case of grave emergency, the Imperial Parliament could pass paramount legislation. Such legislation would be manifestly difficult to secure, and the recognition of this difficulty might be turned to political use in the Dominions. But, as against this undoubted danger, the sense of responsibility would be increased in the Dominions and might be trusted. He further urges that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council be transformed into a supreme court of final appeal for the Empire, by including in its members permanent and effective representation from the Dominions and transferring to it judicial appeals in the United Kingdom, which are now heard in the House of Lords. The Dominions should also be repre-

sented, when desired, in all international conferences, political or otherwise, by plenipotentiaries nominated by their governments and appointed by the King on the advice of the Imperial government.

His three remaining suggestions are simple, but of supreme importance:

(1) "It is an essential condition for the attainment of Imperial unity that the governments of the Dominions should take into their earnest consideration the means by which, while preserving essential homogeneity of race, free and unrestricted entry into the territories shall be secured to all educated British Indian subjects, and that all restrictions which are, at present, on grounds of race and colour only, imposed on British Indians who are legitimately resident in the self-governing Dominions should be rescinded."

South Africa, of course, is the storm centre of the Indian problem. How must the educated British Indian think of his position as against that of the African negro? But neither can he forget that Canada welcomes Lithuanians, Doukhobors and Galicians but not British Indians. Mr. Keith urges, a step taken since he wrote, that India should be represented at the next Imperial Conference by a member of the Indian race. Nothing would do so much to bring home to British and Dominion statesmen the gravity and character of the Indian problem, and the nature of the great responsibility which we have to carry.

(2) If possible, a Dominion minister of cabinet rank should be continuously present in London to keep his government informed of foreign policy.

"It may safely be predicted that, if the Dominion representatives are to have only such control of or intelligence of foreign policies in their relation to the Empire as they can pick up once in four years at a very much overcrowded conference, they are not likely to benefit the Empire very seriously by their advice" (p. 549). "It is creditable to the intelligence of Sir C. Tupper that as far back as 1891 he saw quite clearly that the only possibility of establishing a Council of Advice would rest on the sending of ministers,

not officials, to represent the government of the Dominions" (p. 547). "Everything tends to show that the Committee of Imperial Defence will develop as a mode for the time being of assisting the appreciation of foreign affairs by the Dominions" (p. 550).

Mr. Keith's whole treatment of this question of a voice in the control of foreign policy is characteristically sane and noble. It does not follow that to share the responsibility by taking common counsel in matters of foreign policy involves sharing authority, as Mr. Asquith would seem to have put it in the Imperial Conference in 1911. Moreover, except in the literal constitutional sense, it certainly increases the responsibility of the Imperial government. For it would be a serious step to act contrary to the deliberate advice of the Dominions, and the necessity of justifying such a course to Parliament might sometimes exert a salutary influence. Mr. Keith warns both Imperial and Dominion ministers against constructing too hastily the hard dilemma involved in this sharing of authority.

(3) Lastly, Mr. Keith points to the object lesson of the present war in strategy. Civilization is being saved, we hope, by the presence of the Grand Fleet in the North Sea, and by this alone. The Fleet does not exist to draw the Empire together but to defend it, and sentiment must give way to strategy. He urges therefore that defence should be conceived upon an Imperial basis. The chapter on naval defence is singularly convincing and moderate. Local pride and patriotic sentiment could be sufficiently met by the possession of naval bases, cruisers, submarines and destroyers.

Adoption of the foregoing counsels would, Mr. Keith conceives, constitute an Imperial partnership, a moral partnership, human, workable for perhaps an indefinite period, expressing in good measure the instinct which brought about the marvellous rally of the Empire in August 1914, and leaving further development to the future. The advantage of such a partnership in the matter of India should

be obvious, when we reflect upon what must be the attitude of India to the Dominions.

Federation of the Empire Mr. Keith dismisses as an ideal upon which the future alone can give us light. But to the question of independence of the Dominions he devotes an important chapter, and submits the argument of the *Kingdom Papers* to destructive analysis. It is more than doubtful whether Mr. Ewart's analogy of the Kingdom of Hanover will hold in modern international law and it is certain that, if the plan were entered into in the spirit which pervades the *Kingdom Papers*, it could mean only speedy separation. They embody the unpleasant memories of the Alaskan boundary arbitration, and with Mr. Ewart's criticism of this unfortunate passage in Canadian history Mr. Keith is in frank agreement. But the remainder of Mr. Ewart's argument to show that Great Britain has consistently sacrificed Canadian to Imperial interests where they conflicted is examined and refuted in convincing detail.

The Empire on the Anvil. By W. Basil Worsfold.
London: Smith Elder & Co., 1916. Pp. xvi, 242.

Mr. Worsfold believes with Lord Sydenham of Combe, who writes the introduction, that the "path of least resistance" along which we have been travelling in our instinctive search for some form of Imperial unity would have eventually ended in separation of the Dominions, but that the war has brought our great opportunity. For, in the first place, never again can we hope for so powerful and spontaneous an impulse to common action as in this time of stupendous common sacrifice, and, in the second place, never before have we seen so clearly what it might mean to preserve and develop one quarter of the habitable globe in the interests of these many peoples under one flag.

His appeal is directed to the people of the United Kingdom. He firmly believes that under a form of federation the British peoples could so manage their vast heritage and trust as to secure a greater material welfare than would ever otherwise be possible. But he is conscious of the immense

sacrifice of sovereignty which the electors of the United Kingdom are called upon to make. Against this the material compensation will seem unevenly distributed. "What is certain is, that the masses of the electorate are conscious of their present power and will require a substantial equivalent for their sacrifice; and that the relief of the United Kingdom from a part of the burden of Imperial taxation is an advantage from which not they, but the (relatively) few electors of the income tax-paying classes will directly benefit". The indirect benefit will be certain but not immediately visible. "There is only one recompense which they will consider adequate, and only one ground upon which an effective appeal for their support can be based. It is the well founded belief that the organized strength of this British Empire will suffice to secure peace to the peoples within its borders, and, in concert with the kindred Anglo-Saxon system of the United States, to maintain the peace of the world". Between one fourth and one third of the voters who will have to decide the question will have been face to face with reality and "have come to see the things that really matter". "They will realize with pride that the British Empire has been and is, in Lord Rosebery's words, 'the greatest secular agency for good yet known to the world', and recognize that to add to the sum of its resources and the efficiency of its administration will be the only fitting and sufficient recompense for the surrender of their exclusive power to guide its destinies: that, in a word, the federation of the British Empire will do more than any other single event to rid the world of the cruel and wasteful militarism by which it has been so long oppressed" (pp. 138-9).

Canadians have but a very faint realization of how much the vast problem before us is, to the greater part of the Empire and the Allies, an immediate and personal question of peace and the removal of a peril never felt in Canada. To Canada, as to all North America, it is an abstract question of world-peace, and vague apprehensions rise in the minds of some that in drawing together we shall

only be constructing what the world will regard as a menace. But Canada has shown herself open to the argument for "fair trade" and a policy of mutual commercial concessions, and it is congenial doctrine that Canada will be doing the Empire her greatest service by developing her resources and accumulating wealth. Now Mr. Worsfold has a sentence which cuts very deep into the question of world-peace: "Until the military régime has given place to an industrial régime throughout the world, the fiscal policy of nations will be governed by political and military, as well as economic, considerations". We thought we had reached the industrial régime. Does it mean peace and would the arrival of an industrial Canada as another unit in the world of sovereign powers organized as business concerns be a contribution to the world's peace?

But is Mr. Worsfold right in dismissing the "path of least resistance" as meaning eventual dissolution? Reduced to its lowest dimensions, the practical question would appeal to the writer to be this: Shall we stay with our own, and manage as partners those interests which are vital to the whole, or, obsessed by doctrine, take a step which, unseen by the many, can mean only ultimate separation? Such a step can be made inevitable by both the United Kingdom and the Dominions, by an absolute refusal on the one side to share authority and on the other to share responsibility. Let us avoid it. The immediate "path of least resistance" lies in developing the Imperial Conference and especially, as Mr. Keith would say, the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Imperial government can insist over-much upon the impossibility of sharing authority, and the Dominion government can refuse to create permanent ministers to co-ordinate with the Imperial authorities or to contribute to defence treated upon an Imperial basis, from a perception of the implications involved. Pass this point and the future is saved. Whether such a moral partnership shall go on to develop organic federation is something which may be trusted to the genius of Liberalism and of free institutions. It may or may not be true that the ultimate welfare of the whole and

of the parts calls also, as Mr. Worsfold argues, for a common fiscal policy. We are well aware that the cruel logic of events will compel us to reopen questions we thought closed. But it is begging the question to argue with Mr. Worsfold that the surrender of Imperial control of fiscal policy has lost the Empire the greater part of the surplus capital of Great Britain and checked the development of the Dominions, while increasing the resources of foreign states. In the matter, however, of the defence of the Empire we know that we do not in our hearts differ. We simply know that, if the great issue of to-day had depended upon the arrival of the contingents from the Dominions across from 3,000 to 12,000 miles of ocean, what survived of civilization would have been mourning the fact that we British had at last failed to reconcile liberty and government.

But Mr. Worsfold predicts the failure of "the path of least resistance" for another reason, and we cannot agree with him. The reason is, that the Imperial Conference or the Committee of Imperial Defence must at once become a chamber of delegates appointed by the parliaments of the Empire, and *ipso facto* superior to the Imperial Parliament. Such a joint ministry works in Austria-Hungary, only because the Crown has executive power, and Mr. Worsfold dismisses gradual development in this direction as out of the question. This is to emphasise Mr. Asquith's position that authority cannot be shared and to refuse to trust the genius of liberty to transform voluntary into constitutional responsibility.

For a "half-way house" Mr. Worsfold suggests the admission of Indian representatives to the Imperial Conference and the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the creation of a "Dominions' Council of Delegates", the Dominions agreeing to participate in the defence of the Empire for a period of ten years upon a basis adjusted to two-thirds of the burden carried by the United Kingdom, and possessing the power of withholding supplies, the Foreign Secretary forming the constitutional link between this Council and the Imperial Parliament, the Council to meet once a year.

He thus makes a serious attempt to give a literal share of authority in the constitutional sense. One's first impression is that this amounts to inserting into the British constitution something like a diminished Roman tribunate. He makes no attempt to analyse the working of this half-way house.

The fact surely remains that the Imperial Council and the Committee of Imperial Defence are the living core in our Imperial development, and that they are both the undoubted outcome of the original Imperial Federation League founded in 1884 under the chairmanship of the Right Hon. W. E. Forster, Liberal M.P. for Bradford.

It is interesting to observe among its resolutions the following statement of principles:

That the object of the League is to secure by federation the permanent unity of the Empire.

That no scheme of federation should interfere with the existing rights of local parliaments as regards local affairs.

That any scheme of Imperial federation should combine on an equitable basis the resources of the Empire for the maintenance of the common interests and adequately provide for an organized defence of common rights.

That the League invites the support of men of all political parties.

In Canada, as we know, the Canadian branch of the League, which was founded in 1885, emphasized the economic aspect of unity by advocating reciprocal tariffs.

In 1891 the League resolved to approach the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, with a definite request for the summoning of an Imperial convention *ad hoc*. Lord Salisbury pointed out that some well considered plan was required before any such convention should be summoned. Thus challenged, the League drew up a plan in 1892, and presented it to the new Prime Minister, Mr. Gladstone, on April 13, 1893, who refused to entertain it, as suggesting a reversal of the policy of free trade and as not sufficiently definite in regard to the principles upon which the burden of defence should be distributed. The central body of the League then voted to disband.

But the League cannot be said to have ended in failure. The report presented to Mr. Gladstone, which bore, among others, the names of Lord Brassey (Chairman), James Bryce, Sir Charles Tupper, is, as Mr. Worsfold justly points out, a remarkable document, anticipating and going beyond the advances made in the last twenty years. Nothing shows better than this report that "constitution-making" for the Empire is more than a pastime. It is only by responding to such challenges for the concrete as were made by Lord Salisbury and Mr. Gladstone that progress is made and mistakes in principle eliminated, as we slowly proceed to a goal which may be something other than any we have yet conceived. The report contains in outline, as will be seen, the Imperial Council of Mr. Z. A. Lash, and clause XXII deserves quotation:

"The method of raising contributions would probably by general consent be left at the outset to the choice of the individual self-governing states. But future developments may disclose a means of raising the necessary contributions upon some uniform principle throughout the Empire, by the allocation to this purpose of special sources of revenue or otherwise".

The main portion of Mr. Worsfold's book is given to the development of a complete federal constitution for the Empire. The parliament of this "British Union" consists of the Crown advised by its ministers or a cabinet of ministers; a "British Senate" of 200 members, 150 chosen from the white states, 50 from the coloured; and a "House of Representatives" of 400 members, 300 elected by the people of the white states, 100 by the coloured peoples (on a basis borrowed from our experience in Egypt and India).

The Imperial sources of revenue will be mainly: (1) Imperial duties on imports; (2) taxes on luxuries and certain non-necessary commodities within and without the Union; (3) income from unalienated property of the Crown; (4) contributions from the state governments, on a basis of assessment which will have to allow at first for the fact that the Dominions have had to find immense sums of money for

internal development. "Broadly speaking, while the United Kingdom, as a state, holds a position analogous to that of a householder whose income is derived largely from inherited property and investments, the Dominions, as states, are in the position of a householder whose income is derived mainly from his yearly earnings".

The argument for "fair trade" is presented again to the author's countrymen with great clarity and moderation. The present economic schism in the interests of the Empire can, he urges, be removed, and he believes that its removal is necessary for Imperial federation. But even more necessary is the removal of the doctrinal sensibilities of the Dominions, as will be perceived from Mr. Worsfold's account of the proposals to the self-governing colonies by Mr. Lyttelton, the successor of Mr. Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary, dated April 20, 1905. Mr. Lyttelton had suggested a permanent commission of enquiry and a permanent secretariat for an Imperial council (on which India should be represented). The Canadian government's reply began thus, "The Committee (of the Privy Council) at the outset are disposed to consider that any change in the title or status of the Colonial Conference should rather originate with and emanate from that body itself", and went on to say "they entertain with some doubt the proposal to change the name of the Colonial Conference to that of the Imperial Council, which they apprehend would be interpreted as marking a step distinctly in advance of the position hitherto attained in the discussion of the relations between the mother country and the colonies".

Defence and Foreign Affairs. By Z. A. Lash. Toronto: The MacMillan Company of Canada, 1917. Pp. 86.

What federationists would call another "half-way house" has been constructed by Mr. Z. A. Lash. "Even an impracticable proposal", he modestly says, "often leads the argument along practical lines and produces some practical and beneficial result". He challenges Mr. Curtis's

position that the government of dependencies cannot be separated from foreign affairs, and in an appendix frames an actual Agreement between the United Kingdom and the various self-governing units of the Empire, constituting a central authority for defence and foreign policy. Briefly, this Agreement leaves the administration of the dependencies and crown colonies and protectorates to the parliament of the United Kingdom and preserves to the Dominions "*the autonomy which they now possess respecting all other affairs*". This central authority—the "Imperial Council"—possesses the right of eminent domain in the field of its jurisdiction and the power of recovery of expenses from other authorities. "Never state the reasons for your verdict" is not a maxim of the author. The rest of the book forms a commentary on the Agreement and the reasons are given with admirable lucidity and directness. Manifestly this "half-way house" is built a considerable distance beyond that of Mr. Worsfold.

Mr. Lash is clearly convinced that the Dominions have reached the point when they wish to contribute their share to Imperial defence and to have a voice in the control of foreign policy, while as yet they are reluctant to undertake the administration of the dependencies. It may seem illogical that we should be willing to defend the dependencies, while loath to assist in working out their future, but the Empire itself is not a triumph of logic. It is at least a merit of this plan that it does not raise the formidable difficulties presented by the attitude of India to the Dominions.

Mr. Lash purposely avoids inserting fiscal detail. An agreement between free peoples presupposes their ability to settle these on the lines of freedom. But it may fairly be said that defence as an Imperial question is left in an uncertain position. The Dominions have their fleets, but whether they contribute to a Imperial fleet is not clear.

The New Imperial Partnership. By Percy Hurd and Archibald Hurd. London: John Murray, 1915. Pp. xvi, 322.

Readers of the Hurds will know what to expect in this argument for treating defence as an Imperial question—bluff and trenchant common-sense, occasionally harsh and repellent, but sincere; not without idealism, but in immediate touch with facts, which cannot be set aside, and must be treated as facts until they are transformed. Their analysis of alliance and partnership is needlessly offensive, but it cannot be gainsaid. The ugly possibilities of international trade rivalry are once more presented in a form which chills the heart. But frankly to face the facts of international relations is not to despair of their modification. We may hope that militarism is broken, but armaments will remain.

Canada's fiscal relations with the United Kingdom, terminating at length in the denunciation of the treaties with Belgium and the German Zollverein, are treated with some detail. It was in the year following the vigorous demonstration of Canadian fiscal autonomy in the "National Policy" campaign of 1878 that the first approaches were made for a treaty of reciprocity. "In these Canadian approaches we have the germ of the Empire preference movement which has since inspired so much of the thought of the statesmen of the Dominions".

The authors are not disconcerted with the temporary character of all Imperial relations or the impossibility of forecasting any constitutional reconstruction of the Empire, which as Sir Robert Borden reminds us "is in some respects a mere disorganization". "Believing in the British Empire as one of the most potent instruments for diffusing the blessings of law and order, freedom and duty, service and mercy throughout the world—and, what is for us of great importance, *our particular brand* of instrument—realizing also that no self-governing portion of the Empire conceives a nobler future and a greater destiny for itself outside rather than inside that Empire, we shall follow the traditional lines of British wisdom and get on with our work together,

knowing that the machinery of the state will be adapted to our new needs as they arise. Our prime concern, as practical people, must be, in Mr. Fisher's words, to get into the closest possible touch with one another in the day-to-day relationships of life".

There is abundance of material in the book for a working knowledge of what is practically involved in the problem of Imperial armaments, and a particular interest attaches to the examination in the light of the war of Mr. Churchill's speech of March 17, 1914, with the Australian comment upon it and of Sir William Nicholson's Memorandum to the Imperial Conference in 1909.

The Commonwealth of Nations. London: Macmillan & Co., 1916. Pp. iii, xviii, 722.

This fine volume is of composite authorship. Mr. Curtis acts simply as editor. We have here a work worthy to stand beside *The Wealth of Nations* and destined perhaps to exert a similar influence throughout the English-speaking world. It is a most noble presentation of the growth and genius of the British Empire. One will search in vain for a juster conception of the meaning of law in this great development. We might describe the work as an attempt to set forth the secular growth of the western ideal of democratic citizenship, inspired by the buoyant belief that our vast Empire will eventually complete its task of nation-building, and that it will work out the conciliation of freedom and government, liberty of the individual and the aspirations of nations, within the compass of a single state. There is also discernible in the background the hope of a common future for the English-speaking peoples, and the quiet conviction that these are stages on the way to a distant world-state.

The experience of the Greek world, of the dual monarchy of England and Scotland, of Irish history, of the effort to induce the American colonies to pay a portion of the expenses of their own defence, which led to external taxation, rebellion and the great schism in the English-speaking race, and, lastly, the struggle of the thirteen liberated States to

find some unifying principle which should enable them to carry on a corporate life, are all used to point the moral that people have no consecutive interest in a matter for which they are not called upon to make some direct, conscious sacrifice.

In regard to all this, two questions force themselves upon us. Does the completion of British citizenship for Canadians demand a unitary state? Is a unitary state the best expression of this like-mindedness and community of ideals and past experiences which have never in human history displayed a greater power than at this moment?

Yet we greatly misinterpret the work if we conceive it as the expression of racial pride or of the human eagerness to give immutable form to living achievement. "O stay, thou golden moment" is not the note, but a sense of duty so profound, so stirring, that the results will be carried on, whatever be the form that the Empire will and must take in its effort to discharge the heavy obligations of which we were never so conscious as now.

The Problem of the Commonwealth. By Lionel Curtis.
Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada,
1916. Pp. xii, 247 and Appendix.

The unfortunate results of the sudden presentation to the Imperial Conference of 1911 of a subject of vast and paramount importance, for which the members were absolutely unprepared, cannot be too deeply deplored. The chief blame must rest upon Sir Joseph Ward, who, at the last moment, threw over the proposal forwarded by New Zealand for an Imperial advisory council with representation from all parts of the Empire, self-governing or not. As a body the Conference apparently failed even to recognize that the scheme which Sir Joseph did present was really a form of federation. As might have been foreseen, Sir Joseph was unable to defend his case against the fire of hasty criticism, fundamentals were never detached and Mr. Asquith crowned the unhappy discussion by the dilemma which he constructed and the now historic phrase "authority cannot

be shared". Mr. Asquith himself may to-day regret the manner in which he terminated the discussion as much as Sir Joseph Ward the precipitation of it. It was a lawyer's treatment of an issue which transcends doctrine.

We have seen the concrete results of the challenge made by Lord Salisbury and Mr. Gladstone for a definite plan. It is perhaps not too much to say that Mr. Curtis would appear to have accepted the phrase "authority cannot be shared" as a similar challenge and as axiomatic truth, with the result that the *Problem of the Commonwealth* is marred by a provocative dogmatism which diverts attention from the real nobility and power of the main argument. For the meaning of the Empire, the splendour of its opportunities and the responsibility devolving upon its citizens have never found a worthier interpreter. We regret the seer in the assessor. Having once accepted the categories set by Mr. Asquith, he is carried away by the very vehemence of his belief in democracy.

A footnote on page 102 forcibly condenses the practical problem before us: "the miscarriage of Allied diplomacy in the Balkans was largely due to the fact that the cabinets in London, Paris, Petrograd and Rome were unable to make definite proposals to the Balkan powers until the terms had been settled and accepted by all four. What would the position have been if London could have agreed to nothing without the concurrence of Ottawa, Melbourne, Wellington and Pretoria?"

If, as we vividly realize, there are interests of the whole which transcend the interests of the parts, and if the United Kingdom and the Dominions will undertake to handle what is common in common, they will assuredly work out some living solution of the problem.

In the *Hibbert Journal* of October, 1916, and January 1917, Mr. C. Delisle Burns criticises both the *Problem* and the *Commonwealth* with evident *animus*. Mr. Curtis is the administrator, impatient of the living forces of society, and a well known Hobbesian! The latter article is interesting

inasmuch as it indicates the trend of much controversy in the immediate future upon the nature of the state.

In the *Nineteenth Century and After* of March, 1917 (pp. 481-493), the Right Hon. Herbert Samuel suggests a tentative *Organization of the Empire* which also dismisses Mr. Asquith's dilemma. His "half-way house" has two compartments: the present Imperial Cabinet has four members added to it, one from each Dominion, and a small representative Assembly is proposed which "would initiate legislation but not enact it". "The Imperial Executive would present its financial and legislative proposals. The Assembly would consider them; examine them perhaps through its committees; would debate them from the standpoint of the several states represented; would shape them so as to command the best prospect of support in the territories in which they would apply; would finally pass them in the form of bills. Those bills would then be transmitted to the Parliaments of the United Kingdom and of the Dominions, and, if they concurred therein, to the governments of the dependencies and colonies, for their consideration". He points out with much force a practical difficulty in the problem of a representative chamber: "Multiplicity of elections exhausts the force of democracy. The indifference of the voter is the deadliest disease of the democratic system." With western experience he might have added that a growing distrust of representative institutions is a significant tendency in modern democracy and must be reckoned with.

The *Political Science Quarterly* of September, 1916 (pp. 445-452), contains under the title *Reconstruction of the British Empire* a careful and sympathetic analysis of the *Problem* by Professor E. L. Schuyler of Columbia University. His personal conviction is perhaps voiced in the remark: "There is reason for thinking that to-day rational adjustment is in the ascendancy" over "trust to time" and "the gradual progress of forces—already at work".

But the most striking constructive criticism yet offered of the *Problem* has been made by Professor George Burton Adams of Yale, in a paper in the *Yale Review* of

July, 1916, on *British Imperial Federation after the War*. Professor Adams points out that to Mr. Edward Jenkins belongs the honour of "crystallizing into definite form what men were thinking" in two articles contributed to the *Contemporary Review* (January and February, 1871), while the first "practical statesman" to discuss the subject was Mr. W. E. Forster, in an important speech delivered in 1875. Ideas then awoke which will find at least some tentative, practical embodiment at the close of the war.

"I am convinced", says Professor Adams, "that the future historian will say two things of the South African war. One, that its influence in the rise of Imperial unity was no less creative than that of our civil war in the formation of a higher ideal and a more real existence of national unity in the United States. The other will be that the Boer war was the most effective preparation actually made or in one sense possible to make, for the present greater war". Had Germany clearly perceived the meaning of the South African war, "it is highly probable that this war would never have occurred". "Such an experience is epochal and creative, and the Empire has never since been the same". And after the mighty rally at the present hour, "never again can there be any question as to where the colonies stand in their relation to the Empire, nor any doubt as to the existence of an Imperial unity which is in all essential respects national. Never before has it been shown, nor is it likely that it can ever be shown again in so dramatic a way, that in the modern world geographical distance has disappeared and that a nation may exist planted on all the continents and divided by all the seas".

It appears to the writer that these words of Professor Adams go to the very heart of the great problem and that they dispose of any argument that the strivings of the past generation embody simply the artificial. The last two sentences are particularly significant. This is really the theme of Professor George M. Wrong's paper on *The Growth of Nationalism in the British Empire* (printed in the *American Historical Review*, October, 1916, pp. 45-

57): the Empire is a nation of nations. "Let us dismiss forever the superstition that there is any magic in race to hold people together and effect political unity. In the present war the most determined and irreconcilable opponents are two great states of the same Teutonic race. It is partnership in common liberties which unites people. The growth of the new nationalism in the British Empire is just the growth of liberty".

Have we not here a hint, a clew for a distant world-order, growing by partnership and not by fission? "Race" said the veteran French statesman, M. Ollivier, "has limits which cannot be overstepped; fatherland has none; it may expand and develop unceasingly; it might become all mankind".

To return to Professor Adams, who at the time of writing had apparently despaired of his people's accession to the Allies, "From a distance we can see, and because of our distance with good right we may judge that these are indeed high attempts, as lofty political conceptions as any which mankind has yet tried to make real with hope of success. We can see also that, if success is reached in this endeavour, there will have been also achieved the utmost which is possible under present conditions in the realization, security and extension of liberty for all the world".

The particular criticism which Professor Adams makes of Mr. Curtis's argument should be carefully considered. He finds an Imperial parliament "the weak spot in the whole plan". "To the American student, at least, the question would seem obvious whether our form of Cabinet government, by which all need of an Imperial parliament could be avoided, would not better suit the case".

The rapid increase of material in this field threatens to make the task of reviewing a very serious undertaking. As we go to press, Mr. Walter Eves Wismer has just published the first of a series of eight volumes on *Pan-Britannic Confederation*, and the *Manchester Guardian* (March 20th) comes to hand with an "Empire number", containing a

highly important symposium in which Lord Bryce asserts that "the impulse which the war has given to the sense of Imperial unity must not be lost". We must close with but a reference to a series of lectures delivered in the University of London in 1916 on *The Empire and the Future* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1916; pp. xv, 110.) It would be difficult to find more sanity of judgment and creative outlook within the same number of pages. The introduction by Mr. A. D. Steel-Maitland is wholly admirable. Sir Charles Lucas treats *Empire and Democracy*; the Master of Balliol, *The People and the Duties of Empire*; Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, *Imperial Administration* (of interest to Canadians as throwing light upon the working of the Civil Service); and Mr. Philip Kerr, *Commonwealth and Empire*, with the candour and elevation which we look for in all that he writes.

Anyone who wishes either to join or to form a Round Table Group is invited to communicate with the Secretary, The Round Table, 84 St. Mary Street, Toronto, who will furnish all necessary information.

